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International Legal Solutions to the Global Problem of
Electronic Media Region Codes
Miles H. Johnson*

Abstract
Global movement of technology and consumergoods is constantly increasing, and broad
internationallegalframeworks are not comprehensive. One troubling gap in these frameworks
is the question of when intellectualproperly rights (IPRs) should exhaust. International
intellectualproperoy law leaves this issue expliity unaddressed and manufacturers of electronic
media have relied increasingly on technologicalmeasures such as region codes to fill the gap
themselves. Region codes make electronic media playable only in the geographic region of
purchase, breaking the global market into segments and allowing media manufacturers
signficant control over the internationalflow of goods. In effect, the codes create a regime of
narrow IPR exhaustion despite thefact that internationallaw is silent regarding exhaustion.
This system is justified by its supposed economic benefits,yet it creates symficantproblms as
well, such as unfairprices, inefficiencies, and a lack of choicefor specific consumers in the global
market. Scholars have thus proposed two potential international legal approaches to this
harmfulpractice:a TRIPS revision approach and an internationaltrade law approach. Based
on the practicalfeasibility of each solution, this Comment will argue that a narrow TRIPS
revision is the best way to curtail the region code problem. Nevertheless, two doiculies linger.
Both TRIPS-plus agreements and other IP laws thatprohibitTPM circumvention may nulhfy
a region code limit in TRIPS. To solve these problems, the TRIPS revision that handles the
reion code problem must both stand as a complete statement of internationalIP law rather
than merely a minimum standard, and the internationalcommunity must move towards a
moderate interpretation of the anti-circumvention rules by appying them only to copy-control
TPMs.

J.D. Candidate, 2015, The University of Chicago Law School. I would like to thank Jessica Nelson
for her enduring intellectual and emotional support in all of my academic endeavors. I would also
like to thank the CJIL editorial staff, particularly Michael D. Educate, Nicholas A. Plassaras, Lee
J.F. Deppermann and Abigail Johnston, for their comments, critiques, and guidance throughout
the writing process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The movement of technology and information, especially via electronic
media,' is increasingly global, touching on broad areas of international law from
intellectual property to human rights. These legal frameworks will rarely be
comprehensive and technological innovations may fill their gaps, sometimes
with positive effects and sometimes not. One persistent gap is the issue of when
intellectual property rights (IPRs) should exhaust, and how they should be
protected globally. While scholars debate this, manufacturers of electronic media
have begun to use technological innovations to fill the gap themselves. Seeking
to protect their IPRs in the context of this lingering international confusion and
to gain control over the international flow of goods, IPR holders have employed
systems of region codes.
Region codes are technological restrictions that restrict playback of
electronic media based on geographic region. Manufacturers rely increasingly
upon these codes in attempting to protect their IPRs, attaching access
restrictions to movies and video games2 and fracturing international markets.
This allows them significant control over the international flow of electronic
goods, since the codes restrict consumers from playing purchased media in
geographic regions that do not correspond to their codes, unless consumers
circumvent the code.3 However, circumvention is not always easy and remains
likely illegal in some jurisdictions.' Consumers are therefore handicapped-they
must acquiesce to the global restrictions that the electronic media industry
imposes. While the manufacturers cite various economic benefits, this Comment
will suggest that they struggle to accomplish them and harm particular
consumers in the global market, thus constituting an inefficient overreach in the
balance between protecting IPRs and protecting consumer interests.

I
2

I will use "electronic media" as a catchall term, encompassing media such as DVDs,
video games,
and Blu-ray discs, all of which are subject to their own region code schemes.
See Qixiang Sun, Note, The DMCA Anti-Circumvention Provisions and the Region Coding System: Are
Muli-Zone DVD Players IllegalAfter the Chamberlain and Lexmark Cases?, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
Pot'y 317 (2005).

3

4

See id. ("[Mlulti-zone DVD players ... allow users to play DVDs regardless of their region
codes."); see also Phillip A. Harris, Jr., Mod Chis and Homebrew. A Refe for Their Continued Use in the
Wake of Sony v. Divineo, 9 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 113, 115-16 (2007) (explaining that "[v]ideo game
modification chips, or mod chips, are enhancement devices which users place inside video game
consoles to . . . [defeat] the 'region encoding' of video game systems").
This is the case, for example, under various copyright laws such as the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act in the US. See general/y Sun, supra note 2, at 495.
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Given that the current legal framework allows this practice, scholars have
begun to ask if and how it should address its problems, or if it already does.' If
the region code system is merely in need of reform in order to more effectively
achieve its stated economic goals, then international law has little work to do.
However, this Comment's goals are first to argue that electronic media region
coding creates significant problems for the global community that require more
than simply reworking the region code system, and then to outline and respond
to some proposed methods for international law to limit the practice. Given
region coding's close relationship to IPR exhaustion, perhaps the most intuitive
way for international law to address it is through a revision of international
intellectual property (IP) law, such as the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).' However, original TRIPS negotiations were
difficult, and the problems of a renegotiation have caused commentators to seek
other approaches. Accordingly, an alternative is to challenge region codes under
other international trade law principles. This Comment will explore both the
TRIPS approach and the trade law approach, ultimately arguing that a modified
TRIPS revision approach remains the best way for international law to curtail
the use of region codes.
Region codes are inextricably tied to IP law and principles of IPR
exhaustion, so Section II will set some groundwork by summarizing current
major international IP laws as well as the doctrine of IPR exhaustion. Section III
will then examine how region codes work, explain their specific and general
drawbacks, and argue that they are a problem for international trade and the
global community. Section IV will review the mechanics of the two most
plausible approaches that scholars have proposed for international law to limit
regional lockout, summarizing both a TRIPS revision, as well as a trade law
approach to the problem.
Section V will then examine the feasibility of both legal alternatives,
arguing that revising TRIPS to favor a form of international IPR exhaustion
remains the best option for pragmatic reasons-alternatives are simply not likely
to work. Section V will contribute further to the discussion by acknowledging
some obstacles for such a TRIPS revision: the breadth of the revision, issues

5

6

See, for example, Ryan L. Vinelli, Note, Bringing Down the Walls: How Technology Is Being Used to Thwart
ParallelImporters -Amid the InternationalConfusion ConcerningExhaustion of Rights, 17 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& ComP. L. 135 (2009) (arguing that international IP law should be reformed to limit regionalized
electronics, including region codes); Molly Land, Region Codes and Human Rights, 30 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 275 (2012) (arguing that region codes violate international human rights laws).
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 6, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (hereinafter "TRIPS"), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop e/tripse/t_agm0_e.htm.
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arising from TRIPS-plus agreements,' and anti-circumvention rules that are
found elsewhere in international law.' Accordingly, the Comment will present
some recommendations for how the TRIPS revision approach might avoid these
particular obstacles. The revision must be as narrow as possible, it must function
as a complete statement of international IP law rather than a minimum standard,
and the international community must move towards a moderate interpretation
of the anti-circumvention rules by applying them to copy-control technological
protection measures (TPMs) only rather than to access-restrictive TPMs.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUNDWORK
A. Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights
Before diving into region codes specifically, it will be important to
understand the broader international debate about IPR exhaustion. This debate
is contentious and connected closely to the specific technological issue of region
codes. Given this connection, IPR exhaustion can play an important role by
providing an insight into how international law might help to resolve the region
code problem.
Intellectual property law governs and protects the creation of intellectual
works, such as creations of the mind and inventions. It gives the creators limited
rights to control the use and the dissemination of those creations.9 At the most
basic level, governments seek to employ and enforce intellectual property laws as
means to encourage innovation and creation, which in turn leads to both
"economic and social development."' 0 The logic is that, without affording such
safeguards to the creators, they will have minimal incentives to continue creating
"industrial, scientific, literary or artistic" works." Individual countries develop
and promote their own IP laws, but a somewhat extensive international
framework also addresses intellectual property.
One of the most widely contested issues regarding international IP law is
the exhaustion of IPRs. Exhaustion has been an ongoing, difficult international

7

Trade agreements that "go above" TRIPS by providing stricter IPR protections. See infra Section
V.

8

These include rules prohibiting the circumvention of technological IPR protections such as region
codes. See infra Section V.

9

WORLD

PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
3 (2d ed. 2004) (hereinafter "WIPO Handbook"), available at http://www.
int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/intproperty/489/wipo-pub_489.pdf (last visited Jan.
11,2014).
INTELLECTUAL

HANDBOOK

10

Id.

I1

Id.
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topic for many years-long enough for recent scholarship to characterize the
debate as "tired." 2 However formulated, it seeks to define the "territorial rights
of IP owners after the first sale of their protected products."" In other words,
basic exhaustion doctrine says that after an IPR holder sells a work, his IPRs are
exhausted and he is no longer able to control the "disposition of that work." 4
Exhaustion doctrine thus attempts to balance the policies of promoting the free
flow of goods to consumers and protecting IPR holders by providing them with
returns sufficient to continue production." IPR exhaustion in the international
context is best understood within the frameworks of its three most prominent
formulations: national exhaustion, international exhaustion, and regional
exhaustion.
National exhaustion is the most protective of IPRs and is thus generally
favored by developed countries with many IPR holders.' It maintains that a
creator's IPRs are only exhausted in the specific nation of first sale; once a work
is sold, the IPRs are exhausted in that particular domestic market." Parallel
IPRs, or IPRs in the same work, remain enforceable in other countries until
exhausted by first sale in those countries.'" The effects of this are various and
generally favor IPR holders. For one, it allows them to "segment the
international market" and prevent goods from one jurisdiction from entering
another." With the international market effectively segmented, IPR holders are
able to charge a different, profit-maximizing price in each distinct market, thus
raising overall profits and making goods more widely available to consumers. 20
In the specific case of electronic and entertainment media, however, there is

12

Christopher B. Conley, Comment, ParallelImports: The Tired Debate of the Exhaustion of Intellectual
Property Rights and Why the VTO Should Harmoniqe the HaphaZardLaws of the International Community,
16 TuL.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 189 (2007).

13

Id. at 189.

14

Michael V. Sardina, Exhaustion and First Sale of Intellectual Property, 51 SANTA ClARA L. Rilv. 1055,
1056 (2011).
See generaly id. (briefly explaining the policies behind the exhaustion doctrines).

15

TRIPS,

16

See Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The IVO,
Exhaustion and a Few OtherThings, 21 MICH.J. INT'L L. 333, 341 (2000).

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id
Carsten Fink, Entering the jungle of Intellectual Property Rights Exhaustion and ParallelImportation, in

20

International IPR

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH

171, 176 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005).
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reason to think that price discrimination might be more harmful than
beneficial."
An international exhaustion regime falls on the opposite end of the
spectrum, eschewing any such market segmentation in favor of the free flow of
IPR-protected goods. International exhaustion holds that first sale in any
country exhausts the holder's IPRs worldwide;22 after the sale, the IPR holder's
rights exhaust with respect to "parallel IPRs in all . .. other jurisdictions."23 This
means that once consumers purchase IPR-protected works anywhere in the
world, they are free to distribute those works internationally, without regard to
the IPR holder. Where national exhaustion tilts in favor of giving more control
to the producer, an international exhaustion regime favors the consumer and the
unobstructed flow of goods across borders.
Community or regional exhaustion falls between the national and
international regimes, applying principles of national exhaustion to an area wider
than just one nation while refraining from expanding them so far as to be
global.24 For example, the European Union allows IPRs to exhaust within the
entire region of the EU rather than by individual country.25 This type of
exhaustion regime creates a middle ground between the two others, but it
nevertheless fails to solve the ultimate debate.2 6 In other words, regional
exhaustion carries many of the advantages and drawbacks of national
exhaustion; it simply does so based on an organizational principle broader than
nation-by-nation. Because it thus functions as a national exhaustion regime in
which the relevant borders are not nations, but regions of nations, it resembles
the current structure of the DVD region code system, which organizes the globe
into eight regions rather than by individual nations.27 The fact that regional
J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDoZO L. Riv. 55, 93 (2001)
(expressing concern that price discrimination of copyrighted entertainment products "causes the
sum of consumer surplus for favored and disfavored consumers to fall in a market with mostly
low-income consumers," therefore "[exacerbating] income inequality by transferring wealth from
the poor consumers to the firm."); see also Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Propery Arbitrage: How
Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U. CM-. L. Riv. 223, 229 (2004) (suggesting that
"price discrimination in IP markets is not always benign"); see also discussion infra Section II.C.1.

21

See Michael

22

See Chiappetta,supra note 16, at 341.

23

Id
See Vinelli, supra note 5, at 150-51 (explaining and describing "community" exhaustion); see also
Alexander B. Pope, Note, A Second Look at First Sale: An International Look at US Copyright
Exhaustion, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 201, 207 (2011).

24

25
26

27

See Vinelli, supra note 5, at 155.
Id. at 151 ("Many of the complex issues created by national exhaustion remain under community
exhaustion since international trade between members and non-members is the same as under a
national regime.").
See discussion infra Section III.B.
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exhaustion carries the burdens that arise under a national exhaustion regime is
thus significant for this Comment, since it suggests that the current region code
system, as a regional exhaustion system for electronic media, is also susceptible
to these issues.
B. International Laws that Protect Intellectual
Property Rights
Currently, a number of frameworks establish an expansive international IP
regime. This system includes broad multilateral treaties such as the Berne2 8 and
Paris Conventions,29 the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty (WCT),30 and TRIPS, as well as bilateral and multilateral free trade
agreements that touch upon IPRs, such as the Australia-US Free Trade
Agreement (AUSFTA).32 An overview of these laws is important to both the
international legality of region codes, as well as to the ultimate argument
regarding how to deal with them.
The Paris and Berne Conventions were the central international IP laws
before TRIPS brought intellectual property within the realm of international
trade.33 These agreements came about as IP law took an international turn due to
significant increases in production and distribution during the nineteenth
century.34 Growing confusion resulted in intergovernmental talks to provide
international protection to "authors' rights."35 In 1886, twelve countries
negotiated and adopted the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (Berne Convention)-the "first truly multilateral copyright treaty
in history." 36 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property

3o

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (as amended on September
28, 1979), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file-id=283698 (last visited April 17, 2014).
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (as amended on September 28, 1979),
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/textjsp?file-id=288514 (last visited April 17, 2014).
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No.

31

TRIPS, supra note 6.

32

United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, US-Austl., May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248, availabk
at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/usfta/final-text/index.html.
See Carsten Fink & Carlos A. Primo Braga, How Stronger Protection of Intellectual Propey Rghts Affects

28

29

105-17, 36 1.L.M. 65 at 2 (1997) (hereinafter "WCT.

33

International Trade Flows, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM

RECENT ECONOMic RESEARCH 19, 19-20 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005).
3

See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the InternationalIntellectual Property Regime, 38 LoY. L.A.
L. REv. 323, 333 (2004).

3s

Id. at 336.

36

Yu, supra note 34, at 339 (quoting Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International
Copyright-Past,Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1053 (1967-68)).
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(Paris Convention), the corresponding treaty regarding patents, originated
similarly, entering into force in 1884." Both Paris and Berne are important to
present-day international IP law since their terms have been re-negotiated and
updated throughout the years and they remain in effect. 8 Later international
agreements, such as TRIPS and the WCT, reinforce many of these terms.3 9
Paris and Berne set the stage for TRIPS, the international agreement
central to this Comment. TRIPS came into force in 199540 as the international
legal successor to Paris and Berne. It is incredibly important, as it integrates
international IPR protection with international trade law, creating binding
minimum standards of protection for signatory countries to uphold.4 1 TRIPS
development began as early as "[a]fter the Second World War," as developed
countries such as the United States increasingly sought to protect their
competitive advantage by bringing intellectual property rights within the realm
of international trade.42
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized
agency of the United Nations, administered both Paris and Berne,43 but it lacked
adequate enforcement mechanisms." For all practical purposes Paris and Berne
remained "virtually unenforceable except by coercion or diplomacy, and none of
them provide[d] any effective dispute resolution mechanism."" Given these
difficulties and the increasing development of intellectual products, IPRs entered
the debate during the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations in the
early 1990s." This brought intellectual property within the realm of international

3

38
39

40

See WIPO Handbook, supra note 9, at 241; see also Yu, supra note 34, at 343 ("The origin of the
Paris Convention was very similar to that of the Berne Convention.").
See Yu, supra note 34, at 349-53 (describing the amendments to both conventions since the
1800s).
See WTO, Overiew: The TIRIPS Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips e/
intel2_e.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) ("[TRIPS] sets these standards by requiring, first, that the
substantive obligations of the main conventions of the WIPO, the IParis Convention] and the
[Berne Convention] in their most recent versions, must be complied with."); WCT, supra note 30,
art. 1(4) ("Contracting Parties shall comply with Articles 1 to 21 and the Appendix of the Berne
Convention.").
WTO, Oveniew: The TMUPS Agreement, supra note 39.

41

See Chiapetta, supra note 16, at 334.

42

44

Yu, supranote 34, at 356.
See WIPO, Treaties and Contracting Paries: General Information, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
general/ (last visited,= Jan. 12, 2014).
See Yu, supra note 34, at 355.

45

Id. at 355.

46

WIPO Handbook, supra note 9, at 345.

43
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trade and the negotiations produced both the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO Agreement),4 7 as well as TRIPS.4 8
TRIPS was both successful and unsuccessful. It sought to bring
international harmony to IPR protection, and succeeds in mandating that "each
WTO [member] ... provide ... minimum substantive patent, copyright, [and]
trademark .. . rights." 49 Yet it fails to harmonize on the important issue of IPR
exhaustion. Before and during negotiations, developed countries such as the US
and European countries clashed with developing countries."o Developed
countries argued that the segmentation of national exhaustion would help
increase the "creation and availability of intellectual products."" They also
maintained that IPR protection was traditionally a matter of "national
sovereignty" and that international exhaustion would violate this.52 Conversely,
developing countries argued for international exhaustion on the grounds that
market segmentation would contravene the policies and purposes of
international trade law." The debating parties being unable to reach a consensus,
the final draft of TRIPS left the matter altogether unaddressed. Article 6 of
TRIPS embodies this hands-off approach: "[fjor purposes of dispute
settlement ... nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights."54
C. Parallel Importation
Exhaustion doctrines give rise to the issue of parallel importation, which
can function as yet another way to understand the exhaustion debate. Parallel
imports, or "gray market goods," are "branded goods that are imported into a
market and sold there without the consent of the owner of the trademark in that
47

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).

48

WIPO Handbook, supra note 9, at 345.

49

Chiappetta, supra note 16, at 345.

5

51

See, for example, Frederick M. Abbott, The IVIO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 385, 387 (1996) (describing developing country interests during TRIPS
negotiations); Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'. L. 689,
712-14 (1989) (discussing the broader attitudes of developing countries leading up to TRIPS
negotiations).
Chiappetta, supra note 16, at 346.

52

Id.

53

See Frederick M. Abbott, First Report (Final)to the Committee on International Trade Iaw of the
International Law Association on the Subject of Parallel Importation, 1 J. INT'L. EcON. L. 607, 622-23
(1998) (stating that the different competitive environments of varying international markets does
not provide "a policy reason why Members should be entitled to prohibit the importation of
products lawfully produced and sold under patents").

54

TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 6.
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market."ss Importantly, they are not counterfeit goods, but rather genuine goods
manufactured under license of the IPR holder." These goods are subsequently
imported to a market in which the IPR holder has not authorized distribution."
Parallel importation is often damaging to IPR holders because it can undermine
the system of price differentiation that allows them to tailor goods and prices to
different global regions in an attempt to maximize profits and consumer
accessibility.
Understanding parallel imports is important to the ongoing debate over
international IPRs, but this Comment will only consider them to the extent that
they connect to region codes through the exhaustion debate. In serving as
another way to think about the exhaustion doctrines, they can help illuminate
the problems of region codes, which are discussed later in detail. In the market
segmentation of a national exhaustion regime, parallel importers may engage in
arbitrage by "taking advantage of the price fluctuations of an internationally
available product," seeking to purchase the product in its lowest-priced market,
and then distributing it in their own market.s In this case, the good would be an
illegal parallel import to the latter market. Conversely, paraflel importation does
not exist in a regime of international exhaustion, since as soon as the good is
sold, its IPRs are exhausted worldwide and consumers can move the item freely
throughout the global market. Put most simply, international exhaustion makes
parallel imports legal."
III. THE PROBLEM OF USING REGION CODES TO
PROTECT IPRS
A. Region Codes and how they Work
Electronic media producers have sought to fill the gap left by this lack of
consensus about IPR exhaustion.o In other words, since international IP law
does not address exhaustion at all, individual countries adopt differing regimes,
thus prompting electronic media producers to seek harmonization of exhaustion

55

INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK AssOCIATION, ParallelImports/Gray Market, http://www.inta.org/
Advocacy/Pages/ParallellmportsGrayMarket.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2014).

56

Id.

57

Id

58

Vinelli, supra note 5, at 141.

s9

See Conley, supranote 12, at 190.

6

See Vinelli, supra note 5, at 137 ("[T]he lack of global legal uniformity and consensus as to the
ability of the rights holder to stop [parallel importation] has induced electronics companies to
create and embed technologies that bolster the walls of market segmentation that parallel
importers attempt to sidestep.").
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through their own technological measures; they protect their IPRs through
various forms of digital rights management 1 and TPMs. TPMs for electronic
media can take one of several forms. Copy-control TPMs prevent a user from
copying the media while other TPMs simply limit consumers' ability to access or
utilize the media.62 Region codes are an example of the latter, or an accessrestrictive TPM. They allow producers to manage consumer access to media by
geographic region, even after sale.63
Region codes allow producers to embed digital media with an electronic
code that corresponds to a specific geographic region. The code only allows
media playback on devices compatible with its code." DVDs provide a specific
example. For DVDs, there are two necessary components: "the region code flag
on a DVD and the region code check conducted by a licensed DVD player.""
The DVD player's check prevents it from showing the content of the DVD
unless the DVD is embedded with the correct region flag. Video game region
codes work similarly.
The region code system's roots are in the "Content Scramble System"
(CSS)-a copy-control TPM that uses encryption codes to "[prevent] movies
from being illegally duplicated."6 The CSS allows the video and audio content
on DVDs to be "scrambled" during production but "descrambled during
playback on a DVD player.",6 Under the CSS's copy-protection system, DVDs
are descrambled for playback but not for copying. This copy-protection system
has allowed for the increased development of access-restrictive TPMs like region

61

Digital rights management is loosely defined as "a set of policies, techniques and tools that guide
the proper use of digital content." S.R. Subramanya & Byung K. Yi, Digital Rghts Management
IEEE POTENTIALS, March-April 2006, at 31.

62

See John A. Rothschild, Economic Analysis of Technological Protection Measures, 84 OR. L. REv. 489,
493-94 (2005).

63

Id.

64

See Peter K. Yu, Region Codes and the TeitoialMess, 30 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 187, 191 (2012)
("[Rlegion codes direct machines to allow access to the protected content only if the product was
coded to be played in the authorized geographic region.").

65

Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, Recommendation of the Register of Copyrghts in RM 20024;
Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyrgbt Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies at 121 (Oct. 27, 2003) (hereinafter "Register of Copyrights"), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/registers-recommendation.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
See Corinne L. Miller, The Video Game Industgy and Video Game Culture Dichotomy: Reconciling Gaming
Culture Norms with the Anti-Circumvention Measures of the DMCA, 16 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 453, 466
(2009).
Rostam J. Neuwirth, The Fragmentation of the Global Market: The Case of Digital Versatile Discs
(DVDS), 27 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 409, 415 (2009).
See Ahmet M. Eskicioglu & Edward J. Delp, An Oveniew ofMultimedia Content Protection in Consumer

66

67
68

Electronics Devices, 16 SIGNAL PROCESSING: IMAGE COMMUNICATION 681, 689-90 (2001).
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codes." Although region codes developed from copy-protective TPMs, such as
the CSS, scholars have been skeptical about the effectiveness of region codes as
a copy protection themselves, arguing that they provide no additional protection
than do actual copy-prevention TPMs, such as digital rights management
(DRM).70 This is because, even without region codes, producers could still use
"other anti-piracy technologies such as encryption and digital rights
management" to prevent unauthorized copying." In this case, while the media
still could not be illegally copied, it would be accessible for playback anywhere in
the world.
B. Pros and Cons of the DVD Region Code System
The DVD region code system is arguably the most complicated and most
prominent, and so most region code scholarship has focused on it over video
game or Blu-ray region codes.72 The current DVD code system divides the world
into eight regions. 73 Before examining the general harms of a region code
system, it is important to note some of the current system's practical problems.
These structural problems can serve as a springboard to discussing the more
significant drawbacks. For example, DVD region codes may prevent citizens
from buying DVDs that will play on their home players, even when the purchase
is in a neighboring country.7 4
Proponents of DVD region codes rely on several justifications for their
use. Despite the contention that region codes themselves do little to combat
unauthorized copying,7 DVD region codes are sometimes justified as a general
anti-piracy measure. Thus, even if region codes do not provide protections
69
70

71

Neuwirth, supra note 67, at 415.
Sun, supra note 2, at 322 (stating that DVD region coding "provides no additional protection
against copying"); see also Vinelli, supra note 5, at 166-67.
Vinelli, supra note 5, at 166-67.

72

Video game regions are generally less extensive, and a number of video game consoles have
recently eliminated region locking. See Kyle Orland, Nintendo President Defends Region Locking, ARS
TECHNICA (uly 5, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/2013/07/nintendo-president-defendsregion-locking/. Similarly, Blu-ray discs only fall into three regions worldwide. See Blu-ray Disc
Association, Blu-ray Disc for Video, http://blu-raydisc.com/en/Technical/FAQs/Blu-rayDiscfor
Video.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).

73

See Amazon, DVD Regions, http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeld
=502554 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (listing and explaining the structure of the eight DVD
regions).

74

See Neuwirth, supra note 67, at 417.
See discussion supra Section III.A.

75

76

See Vinelli, supra note 5, at 166 ("Proponents
incorporation as a means to stop piracy.").
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against copying that go above other copy-control TPMs, such as the CSS, they
nevertheless seek to ensure that pirated DVDs do not compete with legitimate
"DVDs sold in the primary markets, which have different region codes."" In
other words, DVD region codes restrict the harmful effects of movie piracy by
attempting to cabin the regions in which pirated movies are playable. If a movie
is pirated in China, for example, its region code will keep it from playing in the
United States, minimizing the benefits of movie piracy to the pirates."
Another prominent justification is that DVD region codes allow for
sequential release-movie studios can use them to stagger movie releases
globally, thus gaining a number of benefits." The business benefits of using
region codes for sequential release are legitimate; doing so allows studios time to
"reposition films to fit each respective market," and thus minimize the costs of
preparing movies for global release." Sequential release may no longer justify
region codes, though, due to the increasing worldwide release of certain movies
and "continued widespread illegal downloading," which quickly distributes
movies globally. Further, the actual DVD regions are organized broadly
enough that any one region will tend to encompass many "distinct cultures [and]
distinct languages," undermining the use of different edits for differing
sensibilities." Finally, movies tend to remain region coded long after their
release, which tends to nullify arguments based on release. 83
The fact that DVD region codes fail to serve particular industry
justifications does not automatically mean we should eliminate them; it only
means that the system may need reform. Perhaps if the regions were better
organized, or there were restrictions on the amount of time electronic media
remained locked, the present system could better serve its justifications.
However, the region coding system's drawbacks are broader than its confusing
organization or the inability to sustain industry-specific justifications. Its
conceptual similarity to a regional exhaustion regime for electronic media
extends its international drawbacks further.

77

See Yu, supra note 64, at 214-15.

78
79

Id. at 215.

80

Id. at 201.

81

See Yu, supra note 64, at 205.

82

Id. at 212 ("[]t is highly doubtful that distribution or licensing arrangements...
arranged based on DVD codes.").

83

Id.

Id. at 200-3.
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C. Relationship of Region Codes to Regional
IPR Exhaustion
The innovation of region coding as a widely used TPM creates problems
both for international trade and for IPR exhaustion. It seems that region coding
has arisen precisely because of the fact that international law fails to address the
exhaustion of 1PRs.84 This argument is based on the notion that without an
international regime to address exhaustion, manufacturers seek to give
themselves as much control over the distribution of media and the protection of
their IPRs as possible; they fill the gaps, so to speak. Media manufacturers have
inserted technological methods that restrict access to their protected media
content." Thus, we may understand a functioning region code system as akin to
a regional exhaustion regime that is self-enforcing. Region codes present a
method for IPR holders in electronic media to enforce their own, noninternational exhaustion regime ex ante. By embedding the media itself with
technology that restricts its global movement, IPR producers do not have to
wait for parallel importation to occur, find it, and then enforce existing laws"
against it ex post-the media itself does the job. Since the codes do not split the
market up according to national borders, but rather according to geographic
regions, the particular self-enforcing exhaustion regime it creates is better
understood as a type of regional exhaustion, rather than "national" exhaustion."
However, the two are functionally equivalent; the only difference is where the
relevant geographic boundaries fall."
With region codes in place, the international market for electronic media is
subject to this self-enforcing regional exhaustion regime. Thus, it is susceptible
to the same harms that such a regime may cause. We have already seen some of
the specific ways that the DVD region code system fails to achieve its objectives,
but drawing this link between region codes and regional exhaustion helps to
reveal the broader harms. First, the codes may be unable to implement the type
of price differentiation that attempts to justify them; and second, restricting

8

See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 6; discussion supra Section III.A.

8

See Yu, supra note 64, at 191; Vinelli, supra note 5, at 161-62.
Whether from national sources, such as the DMCA, or from other bilateral copyright agreements
that may go above TRIPS
Similar logic would maintain that complete region code circumvention, either through the use of
multi-region media devices or modifications to devices so that they play media from other
regions, may be seen as the effective equivalent of an internationalexhaustion regime. Media that is
no longer restricted by the region code system is free to move globally; its use is not confined to a
specific region of the world, just as if an international exhaustion regime were in place.
See discussion supra Section II.A (describing that even though regional exhaustion is broader, it
nevertheless fails to cure the problems of a national exhaustion regime).

86

87

88
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parallel imports through region codes is detrimental to international trade, as it
discourages the global free flow of goods. These two reasons suggest that the
costs of region codes as an IPR protection may outweigh their benefits on the
whole. Finally, segmenting the geographic market harms particular media
consumers by limiting consumer choice.
1. Price discrimination difficulties.
One of the most prominent economic justifications for region codes is that
restricting their circumvention and keeping their exhaustion regime in place
allows producers to utilize "price differentiation" to maximize profits and
increase overall welfare. This type of price differentiation can allow producers to
set differing prices in different markets as are appropriate to make goods
affordable to all consumers." For example, if a firm serves both rich and poor
countries, charging lower prices in the poor countries allows "both the firm and
the consumers in the poor countr[ies] [to] be better off," while leaving
consumers in the rich countries no worse off."o This sort of price discrimination
would not be possible without some restriction on goods from the poor country
from entering the market in the rich country, such as region codes. One problem
for this approach, however, is that the consistent availability of ways to
circumvent region codes weakens these economic justifications. Such price
discrimination will be unable to maximize welfare if region code circumvention
occurs, and evidence suggests that it does.9 ' Even the United States Register of
Copyrights has acknowledged the ease with which region codes are
circumvented. 92 Given this ease,93 firms are unlikely to be able to appropriate the
benefits of market segmentation-the increasing movement of goods between
markets that attempt to be discrete will tend to neutralize the positive effects of
price differentiation.
Of course, it is not the case that the consistent availability of a particular
practice means that the law should bend to condone it explicitly, but the case of
region codes is more complicated than this. Various domestic laws around the
world already seem to condone region code circumvention on some level, 94
89

See Fink, supra note 20, at 176-77.

90

Id. at 177.

91

Vinelli, supra note 5, at 144 ("[Airbitrage and parallel importation" are both "practices that are
rampant in our globalized, e-commerce, e-bay world.").
Register of Copyrights, supra note 65, at 122-23.

92

93

See Theo Papadopolous, The First-Sale Doctrine in Internadonal Intellectual Propery Law: Trade in
Copyright Related EntertainmentProducts,2 ENT. L. 40, 51 (2003).

94

See Ian R. Kerr, Alana Maurushat & Christian S. Tacit, Technical Protection Measures: Tilting at
Copyright's Windmill, 34 OrTTAA L. REv. 7, 58-60 (2002-03) (describing the Australian approach,
under which "trafficking in circumvention technologies" is prohibited, but the consumer act of
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undermining its economic justifications even among developed countries. This is
not a case where international law should simply bless the practice of
circumvention because it already occurs; it is a more complex case where legal
measures available around the world will continue to undermine the potential
economic benefits of region codes.
Even if circumvention techniques were not simple and widespread, there is
evidence that region codes nevertheless do not effectively accomplish the
welfare enhancing price discrimination described above. First, the price
discrimination theory is appealing, but price discrimination through TPMs is
costly and "can be accomplished only imperfectly;" thus, there is an argument
that the wider access that circumvention could provide is likely to outweigh
these costs." Second, as an empirical matter, producers do not tend to price
their products in a manner consistent with the theory behind welfare-enhancing
price discrimination." One reason for this is that region codes do a poor job of
reducing fears that the "discounted products [will] flow back to their primary
markets."" Further, the organization of regions, especially in the case of DVDs,
does not seem to differentiate between developed and developing markets well
enough "to allow the codes to function well as a price discrimination
mechanism."" Finally, where price discrimination in "entertainment products"
actually does occur, it may tend to perpetuate welfare-reding income
inequality." This is because "many popular entertainment products" are
intended to appeal to low-income consumers, thus price discrimination that
disfavors low-income consumers will tend to cause consumer surplus to fall in
markets with many low-income consumers.o So, even without the widespread
availability of circumvention, there are likely to be economic drawbacks of
market segmentation and price discrimination in many areas of the world.
Region code circumvention may help to create a more equitable distribution.'0 1

circumvention is not, and the Japanese approach, under which neither the "manufacturing of
circumvention equipment," nor the "act of circumvention itself" is prohibited).
9
96

See Rothschild, supra note 62, at 506.
See Yu, supra note 64, at 207-8.
Id. at 207.

98

Id. at 208.

99

See Meurer, supra note 21, at 93.
See id.; see also Rothschild, supra note 62, at 506 (describing that effective price
discrimination,
implemented by TPMs such as region codes, shifts more, if not all surplus to publishers, and thus
has negative distributional consequences).

100

10

See Meurer, supra note 21, at 93.
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2. Positive effects of allowing parallel imports in electronic media.
Restricting parallel imports in general can help to deter arbitrage that harms
IPR holders and region codes can help to accomplish this in the specific case of
electronic media. In other words, producers may use region codes to help stop
the purchase of media in developed countries and the subsequent resale in
developed countries, where it would undercut the producer's prices. Of course,
given that region codes may not actually effectuate useful price discrimination,
this may be less true in the case of electronic media. Nevertheless, allowing
parallel importation has significant positive effects for international trade. Since
removing region codes would be akin to allowing parallel imports in electronic
media, doing so would result in similar positive effects; it would allow those
goods to flow freely across international borders. Of course, outright piracy
would also allow such a free flow of goods, but allowing parallel imports in
electronic media by restricting region coding would not rise to this level. For
one, region codes are merely an access restriction; even without them, IPR
holders could still combat piracy through TPMs that prevent consumers from
copying media. Indeed, as Vinelli argues, "technologies such as encryption and
digital rights management could be more effective and efficient" than region
codes in deterring piracy.102
Allowing the free flow of goods through parallel imports can "[promote]
efficiency, competition, and an increase [in] welfare for net-importing
countries."' 0 3 This is because the smaller markets created by national and
regional segmentation can restrain competition and prohibit the market from
dictating a fair price for goods.104 Consumers in net-importing countries could
end up facing unfair prices and the producers of protected goods who benefit
from restrictions on both parallel imports and circumvention thus benefit at the
expense of those consumers. The Australia-US Free Trade Agreement
(AUSFTA) provides an example of this. Under AUSFTA, which protects IPRs
strictly, "there is overwhelming evidence to the effect that Australian consumers
are worse off to the benefit of overseas copyright holders and licensees" when a
narrow exhaustion regime is enforced.' This is because these restrictions allow
producers to raise prices substantially above market-by minimizing parallel
imports they create a lack of competition.o' We have already seen that price
102

Vinelli, supra note 5, at 167.

103

Id. at 143.

104

See id.at 149.
David Richardson, Intellectual Property Rghts and the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, 2
Parliamentary Library Research Paper No. 14, May 31, 2004, available at http://www.aph.gov
.au/binaries/library/pubs/rp/2003-04/04rpl4.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).

105

106 Id. at 12.
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discrimination can be beneficial by allowing producers to sell at lower prices,
safe in the assumption that cheaper parallel imports will not undercut them, but
the lack of parallel importation can also allow producers to charge prices that are
too high. The existing empirical evidence suggests that the latter situation is
more often the case. An informal 2004 survey showed that, on average,
"normal" video game prices in Australia were priced around $99.95 Australian,
while the same games in the US averaged prices that were "around 50 percent"
lower in equivalent Australian dollars. 0 7 Recent, more formal surveys have not
indicated much change. A 2013 report by the Australian House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications"
showed, through price comparisons, that "foreign IT companies and copyright
holders may charge Australian consumers over 50[ percent] more for products
such as digitally downloaded software, computer games, music, movies, and ebooks."' Industry representatives stressed the flaws of strict price comparisons,
suggesting that they can "fail to capture 'many aspects' of the consumer-retailer
relationship."o This is important to keep in mind, as higher prices in certain
regions may simply represent what the markets in those regions will bear.
However, the House Committee Report goes on to outline reasons for thinking
that these price differences are unfair to Australian consumers by providing
examples of how they harm a wide range of consumers, including low-income
consumers ,"' universities and their students," 2 people with disabilities,113
libraries and library users," 4 and small business owners." Given these facts,
Australians have unsurprisingly expressed significant reservations about the
further use of region codes and other access-restrictive TPMs." 6

107

Id. at 16-17.

108 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Standing Committee on
Infrastructure and Communications, At What Cost? IT Pring and the Australia Tax, (July 2013)
(hereinafter "House Committee Report"), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary
Business/Committees/House-of RepresentativesCommittees?url=ic/itpricing/report.htm.
109 Mark McCowan & Alistair Newton, InternationalPriceDiscriminationand Parallellporing-

ime to
Take a Deep Breath?, (Aug. 5th, 2013), http://www.corrs.com.au/thinking/insights/internationalprice-discrimination-and-parallel-importing-time-to-take-a-deep-breath/; see also House
Committee Report, supra note 108, at 17-18.

110 House Committee Report, supra note 108, at 18-19.
Mt

Id. at 34-36.

112

Id. at 36-38.

113

Id. at 38-40.

114

Id. at 43-45.

11s

Id. at 45-47.

1"6

Richardson, supra note 105, at 16.
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The general failings of the region code exhaustion regime-their inability
to effectuate their goal of welfare-enhancing price discrimination or to provide
copy-protections above what other TPMs can provide-help illustrate why
region codes may constitute an inefficient overreach in the general economic
tension between protecting IPRs and protecting consumer interests. Generally
speaking, IPR protection gives IPR holders certain monopoly rights over their
goods, and we should only provide these rights to the point where their benefits,
such as encouraging invention and creation, meet the costs they impose, such as
reduction in consumer choice."' The fact that "other anti-piracy technologies"
may protect IPRs more effectively and efficiently than region codes"' diminishes
their added benefits as an extension of IPR protection; and the argument that
region codes, whether because of circumvention or other reasons, fail to
enhance welfare via price discrimination even further diminishes those benefits.
As a general matter then, the costs of adding region codes to the pool of IPR
protections may outweigh the added benefits of doing so.
3. Tangible harms.
Finally, there are also particularized examples of how region coding's
exhaustion regime harms individual groups of consumers. This harm reaches
consumers who seek to use electronic media for cultural or educational
purposes. For example, the "immigrant [family] in the United States" who wants
to watch DVDs subtitled in their own language, either for cultural fulfillment or
to help children learn a native language, may be unable to find them coded for
the correct region."' Similarly, both foreign students studying abroad and
domestic students seeking to learn foreign languages may be unable to obtain
media in their region.120 This impedes the "very important role" that DVDs play
in "language and cultural education."121
The fact that electronic media is coded only for specific geographic regions
also means that consumers who travel, live abroad or for other reasons seek to
view media from foreign regions are often out of luck. For example, consumers

117

See Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus, Why We Study Intellectual Propery Rights and What We Have
Learned, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT EcoNoMic
RESEARCH 1, 3 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005) (describing the general trade-offs in
determining the "optimal length" of IPR protection, such as "incentives to inventors" and
"preferences of consumers."); see also Fink, supra note 20, at 175 (explaining that IPRs "confer
market power" to their holders, which poses a "cost to society" that is "counterbalanced by the
benefits" of creation).

118

See Vinelli supra note 5, at 166-67.

119 See Yu, supra note 64, at 227.
120

Id

121 Id. at 227-28.
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who are "students or workers living abroad for a temporary period of time" are
forced to purchase (or re-purchase) media in the relevant region.122 If they
choose to purchase media abroad, however, they will likely be unable to play it
again when they return home. 123 Even if they acknowledge the codes and
purchase media that will play in their home region, however, there may still be
cultural distortions-the media may not be a genuine representation of the
cultural preferences of the original region. 124 This could extend further and even
lead to a censorship effect, as producers have discretion to make media
completely unavailable in some regions, leading to a "lack of consumer
choice."1 25 While these various harms may seem like mere inconveniences, since
they affect what is presumably only a small part of a given population, they
nevertheless illustrate the various tangible harms that a self-enforcing narrow
exhaustion regime can impose on particular consumers.

IV. THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL LAW SOLUTIONS
Given these broad and narrow drawbacks, scholars have begun to search
for methods of limiting or eliminating region codes. And since region codes
have effects around the globe, the proposed solutions have focused on
international law, asking whether it may help avoid these problems. These
solutions seek to limit region codes either under some form of TRIPS revision
or by relying on other international trade laws.'26 Although the current literature
on this point is not extensive, this section will examine and outline the contours
of these two prominent potential solutions.
A. International Trade Laws and the WTO Agreements
The "trade law" approach asks whether region codes already contravene
international trade law as found in WTO agreements, and if not, how these laws
might be revised to allow them to limit region codes. Region codes affect the
122 Id. at 217; see also Neuwirth, supra note 67, at 414-15 (describing the plight of a "cineaste" unable
to view a particular director's DVDs due to region code restrictions).
123 See Yu, supra note 64, at 217.
124 Id. at 201.
125 Id. at 222.

126

A few scholars have also begun to examine a third solution, which would seek to limit region
codes via international human rights law. This approach, in its simplest form, argues that
international human rights law guarantees a right to access cultural materials, and since region
codes restrict consumers' ability to access and enjoy media that embodies particular cultures, it
contravenes these international human rights guarantees. See Land, supra note 5; Yu, supra note 64,
at 226-30. Legal scholarship has yet to fully examine this solution, but due to the lack of
enforcement and the general aspirational nature of these human rights laws, it seems, at this point,
far less likely to work as a solution than either of the others.
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flow of particular goods in the global market and restrict parallel importation, so
they necessarily have restrictive effects on international trade. Thus, the premise
is logical-it is reasonable to suggest that international trade laws should address
practices that are harmful to international trade, and that if those laws are unable
to address such practices, this represents a flaw in the international trade system.
However, surprisingly little research has been done to examine whether region
coding actually contravenes WTO trade laws. In the only article that appears to
examine the question in depth,' 27 Professor Rostam J. Neuwirth first examines
region coding against general trade law principles, before examining region
codes under specific terms of WTO trade agreements.' 28 This Section will
examine and summarize three issues for the trade law approach before Section V
discusses its feasibility. First, the threshold question is whether the WTO trade
laws even address region coding at all, since the codes are private in origin.
Assuming that they do, the next question is whether region codes actually
contravene the terms of WTO laws. Third, supposing that they do, an issue of
standing remains; who are the victims of region codes, and can they bring claims
before the WTO?
There is a potential threshold issue regarding whether the trade agreements
even apply to region codes at all. The general rule is that WTO trade agreements
apply to "relations between states and between states and international
organisations only," and not to relations between private parties.'29 This is
problematic because, as Neuwirth points out, an examination of the origin and
implementation of region codes suggests that they are private party acts. The
CSS, which makes region coding possible, is licensed to manufacturers by a
private, "not-for-profit corporation" called "the DVD Copy Control
Association" (DVD CCA).13 0 Thus, before even asking whether region coding
contravenes WTO laws, we must address the issue that the laws may not even
apply. If the DVD CCA is a private actor, then its actions in implementing
region codes may fall outside the WTO's purview altogether.
One possible response to this is based on an exception to this general rule
under which private actions can fall within reach of WTO rules if they are found

Neuwirth, supra note 67, at 431 ("[Imt is surprising that there is no legal paper available on the issue
of the DVD-RCS that casts some light on the issue from an international trade law perspective.").
128 Id. at 431-37, 441-58; It is worth mentioning here that although TRIPS is a WTO trade
agreement, and could thus fall within the "trade law" approach, I will set it aside for now. Since it
deals specifically with intellectual property, I will address it in the later section on revising
international IP law.
127

129

Id. at 440.

130

See DVD Copy Control Association, FAQ, availabk at http://www.dvdcca.org/faq.aspx#qaOl
(last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
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to have a sufficient nexus with state action.13 ' The WTO has held that this
determination is to be made on a "case-by-case basis."' 32 Thus, if the particular
case of a private, not-for-profit corporation's implementation of region codes is
sufficiently connected to, or endorsed by state governments, it may bypass the
threshold issue and come under WTO review.
The WTO is yet to address whether region codes are sufficiently connected
to state action, but there are arguments that they might satisfy this requirement.
WTO case law may be read to suggest that a private action's connection to a
state does not have to be overwhelmingly strong to overcome this threshold
issue and allow WTO review. For instance, the WTO was willing to address
whether an Argentinean law constituted of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade' 33 (GATT) violation when all the law did was allow private parties to
act in a way that may have created a de facto ban on exports."4 This provides a
relatively loose framework, thus paving the way for a similar argument for region
codes. Perhaps just as the Argentinean law allowing a particular private action
brought that action under the WTO, the laws that allow for region codes create
enough state endorsement to bring them within the WTO as well. The
procedure used in the WTO's Argentina decision (Argentina)may thus be a basis
for a general argument that once domestic laws allow some private action to
restrict international trade, then they create the "sufficient connection" necessary
to bring those actions within the WTO.
Despite this loose reasoning, however, other rules suggest that region
codes would not be sufficiently connected to state action. The above argument
seems to stretch the Argentina reasoning too far. For instance, private conduct
can only trigger WTO review when it "suggest[s] some unapparent or hidden act
or impetus of an organ of state," rather than when it can merely be connected to
a state.135 Under this rule, it would not be enough to show that region codes are
connected to state action; rather region codes would have to be a "hidden act"
of the state itself. Given the private nature of the DVD CCA, this seems
unlikely. Additionally, other decisions have suggested a stricter rule than
131

132

Neuwirth, supra note 67, at 435 (citing Panel Report, Japan-MeasuresAffecting ConsumerPhotographic
Film and Paper,1 10.52, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) (hereafter "Japan Panel Report")).
Japan Panel Report, supra note 131, T 10.56.

133

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188
(hereinafter "GATT').

134

See Panel Report, Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished
Lather,WT/DS155/R (Dec. 19, 2000).
See Rex J. Zedalis, When Do the Activities of Private Parties Tngger IVTO Rules?, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L.

135

335, 337 (2007) (citing Santinago M. Villalpando, Attribution of Conduct to the State: How the Rules of
State Responsibiity May Be Applied Within the IVIO Dispute Settlement System, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 393,

414 (2002)).
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Argentina, requiring the private action to be 'essentially dependent on Government
action or intervention.""" While a network of laws may condone region codes, there
is no evidence that region codes are dependent on government action. Both of
these rules set higher standards than the Argentina case, and the current
formulation of region codes would not be likely to meet them.
Resolution of this threshold issue in favor of WTO review will not
automatically mean that the WTO will restrict them. Here, the issue becomes
whether region codes actually contravene specific provisions of trade
agreements, and this is where the trade law argument against region codes seems
to get stronger. The first potential problem for region coding arises out of the
WTO Agreement itself, which states that the parties recognize that their
"relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with
a view to raising standards of living, ... expanding the production of and trade
in goods and services," and that they will enter "mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade
relations."' 37 Of course, if region codes incentivize creation as an effective IPR
protection, they may actually raise standards of living and expand trade in goods,
but Neuwirth notes that these general principles might also cut against region
codes. This is because region codes are a "nontariff barrier to trade" and we
have seen that they can have discriminatory effects, either due to explicit price
discrimination, when it is carried out,' 8 or discriminatory impacts on particular
consumers. 139
Furthermore, according to Professor Neuwirth, region codes may
"contradict . . . not only the letter but ... the purpose and spirit" of agreements
such as the GATT and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)."
He flags some particular provisions to make this point. One important provision
is GATT Article XI, which "calls for a general elimination of quantitative
restrictions" on importation and exportation from WTO member countries.' 4 '
Article XI states:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
136

Zedalis, supra note 135, at 343 (quoting, Japan-Tradein Semi-Conductors, L/6309, (May 4, 1988),
GATT BISD. (35th Supp.) at 116).

137 WTO Agreement, supra note 47.

138

See discussion supra Section III.C.1.

139 See discussion supra Section III.C.3.
14

Neuwirth, supra note 67, at 454-55.

141 Id. at 443.

Summer 2014

333

ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw

importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or
on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party.14 2
Neuwirth explains that this provision authorizes "as the sole form of. . . restrictions to
trade, the use of 'duties, taxes or other charges,"' by "prohibit[ing] quotas,
import, and export licenses [and] . . . 'other measures.""" Since region codes are

a trade restriction, and are not duties, taxes, or another type of charge, they seem
to fall squarely within Article XI's prohibited "other measures."
Neuwirth also discusses the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT), another agreement that can provide a challenge to region codes. The
TBT specifies that countries will "ensure that technical regulations and
standards . . . do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade."'"

Already, this raises eyebrows about region codes-they are undoubtedly
technical and they create an obstacle to trade. The pertinent questions are
whether they are "regulations," and whether the obstacle they create is
"unnecessary." Neuwirth suggests that region codes may well be "unnecessary,"
since they fail to achieve many of their objectives.'45 And the question of
whether they are a "technical regulation" is similar to the question regarding
private and state action. An important difference here, however, is that the TBT
itself may establish "state liability of a WTO Member for private action" more
easily than did the above WTO case law.' In other words, it may be easier to
establish that region codes are a "regulation" under the specific provisions of the
TBT than it would be to establish that they are sufficiently connected to state
action to resolve the threshold issue discussed above.
Accepting the argument that region codes contravene specific WTO
agreements could be a heavy blow to them, but there remains the third issue of
standing. Even if we bypass the threshold issue and also find that region codes
violate trade law provisions, we must still ask who its victims are and whether
they will have standing to bring their challenges in the international forum. Even
with a favorable resolution of the first two issues, private consumers remain the
primary victims of region coding, and here we hit another obstacle:
142
143
144

145

146

GATT, supra note 133 art. XI.1; see also Neuwirth, supra note 67, at 443-44.
Neuwirth, supra note 67, at 443 (emphasis added).
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, pmbl. 5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/docse/legal e/17-tbt.pdf.
See Neuwirth, supra note 67, at 446; see also discussion supra Section III (noting the ways in which
region codes fail to achieve their objectives).
See id. at 448-49 (describing how Art. 4.1 of the TBT mandates that WTO Members "ensure that
local government and non-governmental standardi!'ngbodies... accept and comply with this Code of
Good Practice." (emphasis added)).
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"[c]onsumers ... have no direct or indirect way of accessing the WTO's dispute
settlement system."' 4 7 Neuwirth gestures toward two expansions of WTO law,
suggesting that there is both a "need to enhance private parties' access to the
WTO dispute settlement system," and that the WTO's focus must shift from
government action to private actions.148 However, further analysis is needed on
costs and benefits of broadening either or both of these aspects of the WTO,
and there are reasons to think that the costs of these reforms outweigh their
benefits. 149
In sum, the trade law approach shows that region codes may in fact violate
specific WTO agreements, but this conclusion will only matter if two serious
procedural issues are addressed. First, the WTO must be willing to review
private actions, (or it must be the case that region coding is sufficiently
connected state action). And second, private consumers must have standing to
bring these claims to the WTO. In order for the trade law approach to be our
best option for challenging region codes, trade laws must expand to ensure that
these conditions are satisfied. If the right balance were struck between private
consumers' ability to make complaints to the WTO, and the WTO's willingness
to review the conduct of the DVD CCA, then international trade law could
potentially provide a successful limit to region coding.
B. International Intellectual Property Law
Another, perhaps more intuitive solution commentators have discussed is
to challenge region codes by revising principles of international IP law found in
TRIPS-the TRIPS revision approach. While legal academics have debated the
broad issue of IPR exhaustion extensively, the more specific issue of how IP
agreements like TRIPS might address region codes is less prominent. The
connection between region coding and exhaustion suggests that one way to
address region codes is by resolving the exhaustion issue internationally; since
region codes are an access-restrictive TPM, and the goal of TRIPS is to
harmonize international IP law, it may be intuitive that TRIPS is the best
instrument to handle region codes. Further, TRIPS, as it stands currently, is
explicit in its intent to leave IPR exhaustion unaddressed,' making a revision of
its exhaustion principles seem like a relatively straightforward solution. In this
section, I will examine how a TRIPS revision against region codes might look:

147

Id. at 455.

148

Id. at 458.

149

See Section V.A, supra (discussing the costs and benefits these WTO reforms).

150

TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 6.

Summer 2014

335

ChicagoJournalof InternationalI-aw

first, through an exhaustion rule, and second, through a more specific revision
that addresses region codes directly.
1. Revisions favoring international exhaustion.
The broadest potential TRIPS revision that could handle the region code
problem is a TRIPS revision that favors international exhaustion in some
modified form. As shown above, region codes coincide with regional IPR
exhaustion-a regime that is narrower than an international exhaustion regime.
Consequently, region code circumvention coincides with international
exhaustion of IPRs in electronic media, since it would allow the media to move
freely in the global market in the same way that an international exhaustion
regime would. Thus, a TRIPS revision that favors international exhaustion,
either narrowly or broadly, could help address the problem of region codes.
There are several ways in which TRIPS might accomplish this.
First, TRIPS might apply international exhaustion limited by a "rule of
reason."' This approach would make international exhaustion of all IPRs the
default rule, but it would also provide a limit-parties could "prove that
legitimate reasons exist for their IPR to not have been exhausted by a prior sale,
i.e., so that the parallel imports can be stopped."' 5 2 In other words, while
international exhaustion would be the default rule, a party seeking narrower
exhaustion for certain goods could make its case for such a rule. Applied to
region codes, this rule would allow circumvention unless a party seeking to
restrict parallel imports through region codes could show that the various
justifications for using region codes are "legitimate reasons," within the meaning
of the rule. Scholars have suggested that to satisfy this burden, the party seeking
to limit exhaustion would have to show that "the policies underlying free trade
and the IPRs at issue would be frustrated by" international exhaustion.' This
approach is attractive because it is a compromise-while international
exhaustion would be the default rule, narrow exhaustion would still be allowed
where appropriate. This revision may be limited enough to address the concerns
of developed countries that seek a narrow exhaustion regime. In the case of
region codes, there would be an analysis of region codes to determine whether
they came within the "rule of reason," and considering their broad harms, it
seems like this rule could be effective in limiting their use.

151

152
153

See Darren E. Donnelly, Parallel Trade and InternationalHarmonization of the Exhaustion of Rights
Doctrine, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 445, 499 (1997); Papadopolous, supra
note 93, at 56.
See Donnelly, supra note 151, at 499; Papadopolous, supra note 93, at 56.
Donnelly, supranote 151, at 500.
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While the less concrete "rule of reason" model might be well suited to
implementing international harmonization of IPR exhaustion rules with regard
to IPRs across the board,154 a narrower, more bright-line rule may be better
suited to accomplish the more specific goal of limiting region codes. This is
because a flexible model, while it could accommodate "particular exhaustion
regimes" and encourage the participation of all parties affected by exhaustion
rules,' could also create uncertainty. This uncertainty could leave open the
possibility that some formulation of region codes manages to fall within the rule
of reason, thus remaining unaffected by the rule. Once we have settled on the
goal of limiting region codes, a more concrete exhaustion approach is likely to
be more effective.
Accordingly, an even narrower approach would favor international
exhaustion, but only in the case of specific goods. This "selective international
exhaustion by product class""' would be attractive as it is both narrower and
provides a more concrete rule than does "rule of reason" exhaustion; "[u]nder
this type of exhaustion, certain classes of products would be subject to
international exhaustion while others would be subject to only national
exhaustion,""' and countries could negotiate which products were subject to the
narrow regime. This approach would allow international exhaustion only in
electronic media, for example, thus nullifying the narrow exhaustion of region
codes. Scholars have argued for approaching region codes in this way, suggesting
that "[t]he international standard on rights exhaustion should be limited to
electronics to avoid disagreements that paralyzed the TRIPS negotiations and
garner the willing support of more countries.""' This draws on the argument
that region codes enforce a narrow exhaustion regime-producers use region
codes "to compensate for the lack of certainty as to when their rights exhaust
and to counteract parallel importers who attempt to circumvent market
segmentation."" Thus, on this view, the international community should stop
the regionalization of electronics by revising TRIPS to adopt an international
exhaustion regime with respect to electronic media only, rather than to leave
IPR exhaustion either unaddressed or to apply a flexible standard that could

154

See id. at 509.

155

Id.

156

See id. at 499; Papadopolous, supra note 93, at 56.
Donnelly, supra note 151, at 499.

157
158

159

Vinelli, supra note 5, at 173; see also Papadopolous,supra note 93, at 59 (stating that "selective
international exhaustion, after a detailed analysis of the specific product market, seems a sensible
approach").
Vinelli, supra note 5, at 161.

Summer 2014

337

Chicagojournalof InternationalIaw

create uncertainty.'o If the international community agreed that electronic media

goods were a particular product class that could benefit from international
exhaustion, then the regime could apply only to them, effectively eliminating
region codes.
2. A specific revision against region codes.
The narrowest approach would simply prohibit region codes explicitly.
This approach is attractive because it could avoid the difficulties of the
exhaustion debate; developed countries that seek national exhaustion regimes
and prohibitions on parallel imports may be considerably more receptive to a
revision that does not even mention international exhaustion. This revision
would simply prohibit the use of region codes as an access restriction for
electronics; the CSS could still be used to prohibit infringement through copycontrol TPMs. Additionally, the increasingly available"' and increasingly used.62
techniques for circumventing region codes may already be rendering them
ineffective as an access restriction. This is exacerbated as domestic legal regimes

resist anti-circumvention laws.'63 Further, as mentioned above, increasing the
availability of circumvention, whether legal or not, undermines the justifications
for region codes.' 64 Given that copy protections could still be used, and that
circumvention is increasingly neutralizing region codes' effectiveness, inserting a
simple yet specific region code prohibition into TRIPS could be a relatively
painless solution to the problem.

160

Id. at 162.

At the time of writing this Comment, a simple Amazon search for "region free DVD player" in
the category "Electronics" returned over 1,000 results.
162 See Vinelli, supra note 5, at 166 ("However, these [region coding] technologies have time and again
been circumvented and rendered useless in combating piracy.").
163 See Samuelson, snpra note 21, at 228 n.27 (stating that "Finland proposed to allow circumvention
of technical measures for private purposes"); Mike Masnick, FinnishAppeals Court Overturns Decision
That Said It Was Okay To Circumvent Ineffective DRM, Tech Dirt, available at http://www.
techdirt.com/articles/20080527/1606231237.shtml (May 28, 2008) (last visited April 17, 2014)
(stating that a 2007 Finland court decision authorized the circumvention of CSS); AUSTRALIAN
GoviRNMEINT, ArroRNiv-GENERAL's DEPARTMENT, Short Guide To Copyright, 14 (Oct. 2012)
available at http://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/Documents/ShortGuidetoCopyrightOctober20l2.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2013) (stating that, in Australia, region code circumvention
is legal: "Devices which control geographic market segmentation are not TPMs. This means that
consumers can circumvent the region coding devices on legitimate DVDs purchased overseas. It
also allows for the continued availability of region free DVD players.").
161

164

See discussion supra Section III.C.1 (profit maximizing market segmentation cannot work when
consumers circumvent the measures that provide segmentation).
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: WHY A TRIPS
REVISION IS BEST
As some scholars have argued, the TRIPS revision approach is the best
option;"' this Comment will to bolster this conclusion by a sort of elimination
approach-analysis of the trade law approach shows that it is not likely
workable. Further, region codes are unavoidably a method of IPR protection,
and are thus tied closely to the exhaustion debate-two issues that are most
appropriately the subject of TRIPS.
Scholars have taken differing approaches to how exactly international
exhaustion might be used to combat the regionalization of electronics. For
example, while Vinelli also argues that a TRIPS revision is the appropriate
solution, his approach would enforce the revision primarily through nongovernmental, international standards, or domestic legislation.' Donnelly, on
the other hand, favors "rule of reason" exhaustion in general, under which
international exhaustion remains the rule unless there are "legitimate reasons"
for a narrower model.' This Comment suggests a different, more bright-line
approach for TRIPS to handle region codes that is in line with Vinelli's proposal.
Under this approach, a TRIPS revision favoring international exhaustion should
be drafted narrowly and should be a ceiling as well as a floor in international IP
law. Rather than requiring enforcement through non-governmental standards or
allowing parties to get around international exhaustion by showing a "rule of
reason," the revision would seek instead to create a concrete, international rule
against region codes. Once TRIPS actually contains such a revision, an
international standard or domestic legislation will likely be the appropriate way
to get market actors to comply; but before reaching enforcement, we must
address the revision itself. Potential obstacles to successful insertion of such a
revision include the breadth of the revision, the existence of TRIPS-plus
agreements that might still nullify a limit on region codes, and other copyright
laws that may already bless the practice of region coding through anticircumvention rules. Thus, the TRIPS revision approach to region codes must
adequately consider these obstacles.

165

See Vinelli, supra note 5.

166

Vinelli, supra note 5, at 167. Alternatively, he proposes that simple market forces or domestic
legislation could help enforce the TRIPS revision. See id. at 170-72.
See Donnelly, supra note 151, at 509 ("The rule of reason exhaustion model is ... procedurally and

167

substantively the most desirable.").
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A. International Trade Laws and the WTO Agreements
The trade law approach suggests that if threshold and standing issues are
resolved, region codes could violate WTO agreements. This approach would
expand the WTO's focus both to review private actions and give standing to
private parties, since we could then limit region codes as a violation of trade
principles. However, this approach is problematic: the costs of reforming the
WTO's approach to both private actions and private parties are likely to
outweigh its benefits, and even so, there are lingering reasons to think that trade
law would be unable to limit region codes even with these reforms.
There is still a possibility that region codes do not actually contravene the
terms of WTO agreements. In fact, the agreements may even protect the codes.
For example, GATT Article XX may recognize that IPR protection is valid as
long as it is not a "disguised restriction on international trade.""' Region codes
may thus be protected as long as they are not such a restriction. A disguised
restriction on trade must (1) appear to protect "genuine and legitimate causes,"
but (2) have a "concealed character" of protecting domestic production."' It is
not clear that region codes qualify here. They appear to protect a genuine
cause-the IPRs of producers-but this is openly their goal. They do not seem
to have the requisite "concealed character." Lacking a hidden protectionist
purpose, they will not be likely to trigger this provision and the rest of Article
XX may apply to preserve them as a valid IPR protection.17 0
The proposals to widen the WTO's scope to encompass private actions, as
well as to allow private consumers to bring claims before it, implicate a longstanding debate over the costs and benefits of these reforms. Scholars have
argued that the costs of increasing the WTO's scope in either of these ways are
likely to outweigh the benefits. The costs of widening the WTO's view to
encompass private actions include the risk that the adjudicative system would
168

169

170

GATI, supra note 133, art. XX (excepting from GATT violation measures "necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations ... including those relating to ... the protection of patents,
trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices," as long as the measures
are not a "disguised restriction on international trade.").
Chang-Fa Lo, The ProperInterpretatonof 'DisguisedRestrition on InternationalTrade' under the IT/TO: The
Need to Look at the Protective Effect, 4 J. INT'L DISPUTE STrrLMIENT 111, 130 (2012).
Professor Neuwirth is dismissive of this concern, suggesting that Article XX will "prove of little
direct relevance," since region codes originate in a private entity and in the country of exportation
rather than importation. See Neuwirth, supra note 67, at 444. Nevertheless, as suggested above,
there is a good argument that region codes are within Article XX's strict terms, since they protect
copyrights and do not seem to be a disguised restriction on trade. Further, dismissing this concern
because region codes are private actions undercuts the argument that the WTO should address
private actions. Presumably, if GATT rules were expanded to apply actions of private entities,
then GATT exceptions would also apply to them; one would be unable to avoid an Article XX
concern by arguing that region codes were private in origin.
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become "overwhelmed," that "traditional ... business endeavors [would be]
complicated or jeopardized," and that such liberalization would also result in "so
little enforcement" of WTO rules that the rules themselves become meaningless
to member states.'7 1 These are high costs, particularly when other avenues for
challenging region codes exist. The costs of adding a private right of access to
the WTO may be similarly high, including potential state resistance to the WTO
regime and an increased international lawmaking role for private parties.' 7 2 Thus,
the costs of expanding WTO procedures, by bringing private actions within
WTO review, by giving private consumers standing, or by doing both, are likely
to outweigh their benefits. We should have significant reservations about
reforming the WTO in these ways for the narrow purpose of limiting region
codes.
Further, if we assume that these procedures are expanded and a WTO
Panel is willing to hear private party claims, it remains unlikely that the
consumers harmed by region codes would bring claims. As much of the
literature suggests, the victims of region codes tend to be immigrant families,
foreign and domestic students, film buffs, and video gamers. It would remain to
be seen, but seems unlikely that this class of consumers would either have the
resources or be willing to spend them navigating a complicated international
legal network simply to challenge region codes. Further, as circumvention
techniques become increasingly available and increasingly legal, a cheaper and
simpler option becomes available to consumers-just buy a region-free device.
As a purely practical matter, a private right of action to the WTO may not help
to solve the region code problem.
B. Making a TRIPS Revision Work
It is no surprise that scholars have searched for alternative ways to limit the
global harms of region codes, especially considering the potential difficulties of
re-negotiating exhaustion in TRIPS The prominent alternatives are nevertheless
problematic. Additionally, the fact that TRIPS may be able to handle the region
code problem without favoring international exhaustion broadly, since a
narrower revision could still feasibly limit region codes, makes renegotiation less
daunting than it was previously. Thus, for practical reasons-the difficulties
associated with the alternative international approaches and the opportunity for
a narrower and easier TRIPS revision-revising TRIPS once again becomes the
best option for handling region codes. However, there are still three obstacles
171
172

Zedalis, supra note 135, at 362.
See Philip M. Moremen, Costs and Benefts of Adding a Private Right of Acon to the World Trade
Organizationand the Montreal ProtocolDispute Resolution Sjystems, 11 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
189, 224 (2006).
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that the revision must overcome: it must be kept as narrow as possible, it must
avoid the TRIPS-plus problem, and to make it effective, the international
community must take a moderate interpretation of non- TRIPS anticircumvention rules.
The first obstacle is premised on the idea that the narrower the revision,
the less room there will be for negotiation-stalling disagreements. Vinelli has
argued that TRIPS should be revised to handle regionalized electronics by
adopting an international exhaustion model that would be "limited to
electronics."" His proposed product class of "electronics" would thus include a
wide range of goods, 74 and he suggests that "[n]ations that currently favor the
national system could be convinced of the superiority of the international system
through emphasis on benefits such as free trade, globalization, and the
advantages derived there from.""s However, it is not clear that nations who have
favored a national exhaustion regime would be so easily convinced. After all,
during the Uruguay Round, developed nations strongly opposed international
exhaustion despite emphasis on these very benefits. Accordingly, the broader the
scope of the international exhaustion revision, the less likely developed countries
will be to hop on board; thus, an international exhaustion regime covering all
electronics may still be too broad. A similar revision, still favoring international
exhaustion by product class, but with an even narrower product class,"' could
alleviate this concern.
Next, to be a concrete solution, the revision would have to avoid any
potential TRIPS-plus problems. TRIPS is a floor rather than a ceiling-it sets
only minimum standards for IPR protection; Article 1 embodies this principle,
allowing countries to contract above TRIPS provisions."' This allows other
international agreements to extend even higher protections than TRIPS. In the
current international context, Article 1's effect is seen in bilateral free trade
agreements (FTAs) called "TRIPS [p]lus" agreements."' These agreements go
above TRIPS in one of two ways-either by creating "more extensive
173
174

175
176

177

178

Vinelli, supra note 5, at 173.
See id. at 137-38 (discussing the technological regionalization of a wide array of goods, including
DVDs, printers, video game systems, and cell phones).
Id. at 163-64.
For example, the international exhaustion regime could reach a product class of only electronic
media or media subject to region codes, or even more specifically, DVDs alone, or DVDs and
video games.
TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 1(1) ("[Mlembers may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law
more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not
contravene the provisions of this Agreement." (emphasis added)).
See Matthew Turk, Note, Bargainingand Intellectual Property Treaties: The Case for a Pro-Development
Interpretationof TRIPS but not TRIPS Plus, 42 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 981, 1004-5 (2010).
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standard[s]," or by "expanding [intellectual property] protection to new areas.""'
They are often criticized as demanding developing countries to agree to
detrimental intellectual property terms because of bargaining power inequities.
For example, in the TRIPS -plus forum, the "US agenda is transparently
presented as furthering the interest of domestic industry," and the terms of the
FTAs generally protect "first-world IP assets" over those of developing
countries.'" These types of FTAs are widely implemented: "[a]fter . . . 1992, the

United States concluded FTAs with no fewer than fourteen countries," and
"[s]ince 2000, there have been more FTAs.""' In these agreements, the US has
consistently pushed for "harmonization at all costs," on pro-US terms.'
By definition, a national exhaustion regime for electronic media provides
stricter IPR protection than does international exhaustion; narrower exhaustion
regimes restrict parallel imports and allows IPR holders to control the
distribution of their IPRs. A TRIPS revision favoring even a narrow level of
international IPR exhaustion could be subject to the above TRIPS-plus
concerns. Developed countries with considerable bargaining power could
attempt to negotiate TRIPS-plus agreements providing stricter protection than
the revision. Indeed, we have seen the US seek to implement its own goals
internationally through this piecemeal process, so there is little doubt that the
power and ability exists. Yet, if successful, TRIPS-plus agreements such as these
would neutralize the effects of a revision towards eliminating region codes. One
solution is simply to argue that these agreements would be invalid under TRIPS
itself, since Article 1 of TRIPS also provides that TRIPS-plus agreements may
not "contravene the provisions of this Agreement."' 83 An agreement between
TRIPS countries that attempts to preserve narrow exhaustion through region
codes might therefore be void if TRIPS were successfully revised against region

1"

See id.

18

Id. at 1006.

181 Anselm Kamperman Sanders, [ntellectual Properly, Free Trade Agreements and Economic Development, 23
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 893, 897 (2007).
182 Id. Importantly, this is not limited to FTAs with developing countries; the US has also imposed
terms favorable to itself in agreements with developed countries, such as Australia. This is a
testament to the strength of US bargaining power in getting other nations to agree to the IPR
protections that it wants-it is not simply overpowering developing countries with few IPR
holders, but also reaching favorable terms to the detriment of other developed countries. See, for
example, Section III.C.1, sipra (discussing the A.USFTA's detrimental effects on Australian
consumers). As of this Comment, the latest development in the TRIPS-plus sphere is the
expansive Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is currently still in the negotiation stage, and
has so far been criticized for its rather extensive and pro-US IPR protections. See PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE, The Trans-Paafic Partnership Agreement: Your Guide to Copyright in the IPP,
http://tppinfo.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
183 TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 1(1).
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coding, as long as the TRIPS-plus agreement were found to "contravene" this
revision. Nevertheless, if TRIPS adopts an international exhaustion regime that
applies either to region coded goods or electronic media, its status as merely a
floor leaves open the potential for other bilateral arrangements that seek to
somehow favor national exhaustion. To solve this problem, the revision should
not merely eliminate the possibility of region codes; it should also establish itself
as a ceiling regarding exhaustion rather than simply a floor.
The final potential obstacle to a TRIPS revision favoring limited
international exhaustion is contained in the anti-circumvention provisions of
other international IP laws. For example, the WCT prohibits circumvention of
technological IPR protection mechanisms.184 This provision has been the genesis
for domestic anti-circumvention laws such as the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA).'" Since region codes are an access-restrictive TPM, and these
anti-circumvention laws are enforced separately from TRIPS, circumvention
may still be illegal and the WCT may continue to implicitly bless the practice of
region coding internationally, notwithstanding a TRIPS revision that cuts against
region codes. However, the TRIPS provision need not conflict with these anticircumvention rules-countries may interpret and apply the anti-circumvention
rules in a manner consistent with a region code limit.
Interpretations of the WCT's anti-circumvention provision take two
general forms-broad and moderate. The EU'8 6 and the US' adopt the broad
interpretation, reading anti-circumvention provisions to prohibit circumvention
of both access and copy protection TPMs. The moderate interpretation,
however, taken by Japan'" and Australia,' only allows the rules to prohibit
circumvention of copy protection TPMs. Thus, the international community
should move toward enforcement of the moderate interpretation, allowing for
circumvention of access-restrictive TPMs such as region codes, and thus
remaining consistent with a TRIPS revision that limits their use. More
importantly, perhaps, moving towards a moderate interpretation sooner rather
than later could help facilitate the very type of TRIPS revision for which this

186

WCT, supra note 39, art. 11.
See Richard Li-Dar Wang, DMCA Anti-Circumvention Provisions in a Different Light: Perspectivesfrom
TransnationalObservationofFive Jurisdictions,34 AIPLA Q.J. 217, 219-20 (2006).
Id. at 230 (citing Council Directive 2001/29, On the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:167:0010:0019:EN:pdf
(last
visited Feb. 8, 2014)).
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Id. at 223.
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Id. at 234.

184
185

189 Id. at 234-35.
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Comment argues. As long as the broad interpretation carries weight in the
international community, making region code circumvention illegal, it may
provide bargaining power to countries that would seek to fight a TRIPS revision
against region codes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the practical and conceptual problems of the alternatives, a
TRIPS revision approach remains the international community's best option for
limiting the region code problem. However, to be successful, the revision must
overcome a number of its own obstacles-it must remain as narrow as possible,
it should seek to avoid potential TRIPS-plus problems by standing as a ceiling
rather than a floor, and the international community must cooperate by moving
toward a moderate interpretation of non-TRIPS anti-circumvention provisions
found elsewhere in international IP law.
There is no doubt that TRIPS negotiations at the Uruguay Round
encountered problems regarding IPR exhaustion. Developed countries fought
for narrow exhaustion to protect IPR holders, while developing countries,
concerned about market segmentation, argued for international exhaustion. The
two sides could not reach a compromise other than to settle on Article 6's noncommittal approach. It is therefore unsurprising that commentators have sought
alternatives to a TRIPS revision to halt the use of region codes. After all, if
region codes represent a narrow exhaustion regime for electronic media, and
TRIPS negotiations on the point of exhaustion were fraught with difficulty, then
it may be prudent to avoid a renegotiation of TRIPS in dealing with region
codes. However, examination of these alternatives, namely the trade law
approach, reveals that they carry their own practical problems; when these broad
problems are compared to the option of dealing with region codes through a reexamined, narrow revision of TRIPS, it once again becomes the case that, as
others have argued, TRIPS is the best forum for curtailing the international use
of region codes.
There are always complications, and even the best solution will rarely be
perfect. A TRIPS revision dealing with the problem of region codes, even if
well-constructed and narrow, will encounter its own complications. Both
TRIPS-plus agreements, and the continued existence of non-TRIPS anticircumvention rules could impede successful revision negotiations. Accordingly,
the international community must address both obstacles: the TRIPS revision
should be a complete statement of the international position rather than merely
a minimum standard; and the global community as a whole should work towards
adopting a moderate view of anti-circumvention rules, interpreting them only to
refer to the circumvention of copy protections.
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IPR exhaustion in TRIPS and international anti-circumvention rules are
undoubtedly polarizing issues of international law; neither negotiating a TRIPS
revision nor reaching a consensus on a moderate interpretation of non-TRIPS
IP laws will be easy.'" Despite these difficulties, solving the region code problem
through these mechanisms is incredibly important. It will help eliminate private
manufacturers' abilities to limit the flow of goods, information, and culture
through region codes, and this will have far-reaching, positive effects on
consumers as well as on international free trade. Further, the positive effects of
eliminating region lock will only grow as innovation and technology make
electronic consumer goods increasingly important to the global economy.
Reducing regionalization, even one small step at a time, will have broad global
implications-it will pave the way for increased free trade in all electronic goods
and eventually a better harmonization of the conflict between the restrictive
goals of IP law and the expansive principles of free trade.

190 This is especially true in light of pending international agreements that seem to contain extensive

pro-IPR terms, such as the TPP See supra note 182.
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